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Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption and
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum:
Complicating the "Just and Fair Solution"
to Holocaust-Era Art Claims
Mikka Gee Conwayt
Introduction
In Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum,' the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down a California law
extending the statute of limitations for Holocaust-era art
restitution claims against museums. 2 It affirmed the district
court's holding that the statute was preempted by the federal
foreign relations power, reversed the determination that the claim
was time-barred under the regular California statute of
limitations for stolen property, and remanded the case. 3 The
decision prolongs a dispute between the sole heir of a prominent
Jewish art dealer in Amsterdam whose collection was seized by
Nazi agents in 1940, and the California museum that later
purchased two paintings from that collection. 4 Von Saher seems to
be a straightforward application of a line of Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court precedent preempting state action that intrudes on
the federal province of foreign relations.5 But, viewed in light of
this precedent and its particular facts, Von Saher is a flawed
decision that highlights problems with the rarely invoked and
constitutionally infirm doctrine of dormant foreign affairs
t. J.D. expected 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A. 1998,
Williams College Graduate Program in the History of Art; A.B. 1993, Stanford
University. Former Assistant Director for Museum Advancement, J. Paul Getty
Museum; former Assistant Director for Exhibitions and Programs, Minneapolis
Institute of Arts. The views represented in this paper are not the official views of
the J. Paul Getty Museum or the Minneapolis Institute of Arts. I am grateful to the
editors and staff of Law and Inequality for their excellent work on this Article.
1. 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g
en banc by No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010).
2. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(b) (West 2006), invalidated by Von Saher,
2010 WL 114959. See infra Part VI.B.
3. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1031.
4. Suzanne Muchnic, What is Their True Genesis? Questions About Long-Ago
Events Have the Norton Simon Fighting in Court to Keep Its Prized Works, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at D1.
5. See infra Part IV.
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preemption. 6 Further, by placing such a general limit on states'
ability even to facilitate the adjudication of certain claims by
Holocaust victims, it undermines the broadly stated federal
interest in seeing Holocaust-era assets returned to their rightful
7
owners.
This Article addresses dormant foreign affairs preemption
with respect to claims for property misappropriated during World
War II. It argues that Von Saher and the precedent upon which it
relied were wrongly decided. Absent either a clear conflict with a
federal statute or treaty, or an affirmative action by the federal
government, courts should apply a more stringent test than was
applied in Von Saher or its predecessors before preempting state
law on this basis. Beginning with Part 1, this Article describes the
nature and scale of the looting of works of art in Nazi-controlled
territories during the war, which targeted Jews and other
minorities in particular, and the participation of the U.S.
government in mitigating and rectifying the resulting losses. Part
II provides background on states' ability to resolve claims related
to the Holocaust. Part III describes the categories of Holocaustrelated litigation in the United States since 1996, when the first
high-profile cases were filed, as well as the foreign policy
dimensions of each. Part IV outlines the Holocaust-related cases in
the Ninth Circuit leading up to Von Saher. Part V describes the
particular facts and history of Von Saher. Part VI analyzes Von
Saher and its foreign policy implications. It argues that Von Saher
does not present a case of preemption, but rather, a case that is
nonjusticiable under either the political question doctrine or the
act of state doctrine. This Article concludes that there is no
constitutional impediment to states establishing special statutes of
limitations for Holocaust-related art claims, and that such
statutes may further the federal policy of reaching a "just and fair
solution"8 to claims for Holocaust-era assets.

6. See infra Part VI.
7. See infra Part VI.D.
8. Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-Confiscated Art, in WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE

ON

HOLOCAUST-ERA

ASSETS:

PROCEEDINGS

971,

971-72

(J.D.

Bindenagel ed., 1999), availableat http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm.
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Nazi Loot, Post-War Restitution, and U.S.
Policy

Foreign

A. Nazi Looting and Allied Efforts to Protect Works of Art
The story of Holocaust-era art looting as a result of the Third
Reich's systematic persecution of Jews and other ethnic minorities
has been well chronicled and frequently recounted. 9 Beginning
with Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, the Nazi party and its
agents seized millions of items of property-including hundreds of
thousands of works of art1 0-throughout
the territories it
controlled using "theft, confiscation, coercive transfer, looting,
pillage, and destruction."1 1 The pillage was motivated not solely by
greed but also by Hitler's "larger political and ideological
project," 12 which included promotion of his vision of a Germanic
nation and the dehumanization and planned extermination of the
13
Jewish people.
In 1943, recognizing the scale of the plunder, the Allies
formally reserved the right to invalidate transfers of property in
enemy-occupied territory,1 4 and President Franklin D. Roosevelt
established a commission and a military unit charged with
15
preserving and protecting cultural property in the war zone.
After the German surrender in 1945, this unit helped establish
temporary "central collecting points" where more than four million
items of recovered property were recorded and stored until they
16
could be returned.
9. For a detailed history, see LYNN H. NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE
FATE OF EUROPE'S TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(1994). For a more concise overview of the major issues, see NORMAN PALMER,
MUSEUMS AND THE HOLOCAUST: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1-12 (2000).

10. The number of works of art looted by the Nazis is not known-an educated
estimate is approximately 650,000. Jonathan Petropoulos, Art Looting During the
Third Reich, in
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS:
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 8, at 441, 442.
11. AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, GUIDELINES CONCERNING THE UNLAWFUL
APPROPRIATION OF OBJECTS DURING THE NAZI ERA (1999), available at

http://www.aam-us.org/museumresources/ethics/nazi-guidelines.cfm.
12. Petropoulos, supra note 10, at 443.
13. Id.; see also NICHOLAS, supranote 9, at 5-25, 41-49.
14. See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S.,
PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: THE U.S. AND HOLOCAUST VICTIMS' ASSETS SR-139
(2000) (discussing the London Declaration of 1943).
15. See NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 209-22. The American Commission for the
Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas created
the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section to gather, safeguard, and
repatriate works of art displaced by World War II. See id. at 217-27.
16. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., M1941: RECORDS CONCERNING THE
CENTRAL COLLECTING POINTS 2 (2004), availableat http://www.archives.gov/
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B. U.S. Policy and Restitution Practicein Europe
At the end of the hostilities, confronted with massive
stockpiles of recovered property, the Allies adopted a policy of
"external restitution," returning identifiable property not to
individuals, but to the legitimate governments of the nations
where the property had been taken from its owners. 17 Returning
property to governments rather than individuals, while expedient,
was only partly motivated by "administrative convenience." 18 More
importantly, it reflected a recognition of each government's
responsibility to its own citizens and a deference to the sovereign
right of each nation to determine the proper course of action. 19 As
the U.S. committee responsible for shaping this policy noted, "[tihe
question of restoration to individual owners is a matter for these
[legitimate] governments to handle in whatever way they see fit."20
Under this policy, the Allies returned recovered property to
various countries outside Germany. 21 National claims commissions
then returned thousands of works to individual claimants in the
years immediately following the war,22 but even today many works
remain unclaimed. 23 In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and the
opening of previously inaccessible historical records in Eastern
Europe created new interest in the subject of Holocaust loot. 24 In
response, various European governments initiated renewed
research into the history of unclaimed works of art lingering in
of
national collections, 25 leading to new publications, the reopening
26
some claims procedures, and sustained awareness of the issue.
researchmicrofillml941.pdf
organized).

(describing the records held and how they are

17. See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S.,

supra note 14, at SR-142-45.
18. Id. at SR-140 (citing Memorandum from the Interdivisional Comm. on
Reparation, Restitution, & Prop. Rights, Subcomm. 6 (Apr. 10, 1944)
(recommending a policy of external restitution)).
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also id. at SR-139 (citing Memorandum from the Interdivisional
Comm. on Reparation, Restitution, & Prop. Rights, Subcomm. 2 (Feb. 5, 1944)
("[I]ndividual claimants should look for satisfaction of their claims solely to their
national governments.")).
21. See id. at SR-143; see also PALMER, supra note 9, at 124.
22. Lynn Nicholas, Plenary Session Remarks: Nazi-Confiscated Art Issues, in
WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS, supra note 8, at 449, 450.
23. See PALMER, supra note 9, at 118-28 (summarizing the status of European
restitution efforts).
24. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S., supra

note 14, at 4.
25. PALMER, supra note 9, at 129-49 (describing current initiatives to identify
and return looted art).
26. Id.; see also ORIGINS UNKNOWN, REPORT ON THE PILOT STUDY INTO THE
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II. Limits on State and Judicial Action
Holocaust-Era Claims

Relating

to

It is helpful to preface any overview of recent Holocaustrelated litigation in the United States with a discussion of the
limits on the ability of states and courts to resolve these types of
claims. The constitutional principles of federal supremacy and
separation of powers, which together establish that the executive
and legislative branches have primary responsibility for foreign
relations, 27 constrain the ability of states to provide remedies for
wartime wrongs and the ability of courts to adjudicate claims
arising from them. Recognizing this, courts have invoked three
related but distinct doctrines in connection with Holocaust-era art
claims: the act of state doctrine, the political question doctrine,
and foreign affairs preemption.
A. Act of State Doctrine
The Supreme Court articulated the act of state doctrine in
Underhill v. Hernandez28 in 1897 and provided generally that,
absent a treaty or specific rules governing the applicable legal
principles, U.S. courts will not "sit in judgment on the acts of the
29
government of another [country] done within its own territory."
Early post-war litigation in the United States established thatconsistent with the principles of the 1943 London Declaration and
the stated policy of the executive branch-the acts of the Nazi
government were not entitled to deference under the act of state
doctrine. 30 Courts and parties have invoked the doctrine, however,

PROVENANCE OF WORKS OF ART RECOVERED FROM GERMANY AND CURRENTLY
UNDER THE CUSTODIANSHIP OF THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS (1998), available

at http://www.herkomstgezocht.nl/eng/rapportage/index.html (follow "Download"
hyperlink under report title) (unpaginated English translation available as well as
paginated Dutch original); Leila Anglade, Art, Law and the Holocaust: The French
Situation, 4 ART, ANTIQUITY & L. 301, 306 (1999) (describing the status of
restituted works in France).
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
29. Id.; see generally Lucy Dunn Schwallie, Acts of Theft and Concealment:
Arguments Against the Application of the Act of State Doctrine in Cases of Nazi
Looted Art, 11 UCLA J. INTL L. & FOREIGN AFF. 281 (2006) (describing problems
associated with the act of state doctrine as applied to art looted during the
Holocaust).
30. Bernstein
v.
N.
V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
StoomvaartMaatschappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that because the stated
executive policy is to "relieve American courts from any restraint upon the exercise
of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials," courts are
permitted to do so).
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in connection with Holocaust-era art claims involving the acts of
31
other nations.
B.

PoliticalQuestion Doctrine

The political question doctrine, like the act of state doctrine,
is a prudential limitation on courts' ability to hear certain cases. It
serves to prevent, based on separation of powers, the adjudication
of issues best resolved by other branches of government. The most
frequently cited articulation of this doctrine comes from the
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,32 pronouncing six ways
in which a political question might manifest:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various
33
departments on one question.
When a case is "inextricable" from one of these formulations, a
court may dismiss it as nonjusticiable. 34 Courts have both
dismissed, and declined to dismiss, Holocaust-related claims on
35
political question grounds.

31. See United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99-CV-9940, 2009 WL 3246991
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (holding that the act of state doctrine did not require
abstention from hearing a forfeiture case brought against an Austrian museum by
heirs of a dispossessed Jewish owner); see also Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362
F. Supp. 2d 298, 310 (D.D.C. 2005) (noting that federal legislation was passed
specifically to restrict application of the act of state doctrine "as a bar to jurisdiction
over claims to property allegedly taken in violation of international law" (quoting
U.S. Statement of Interest at 5-6, Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 (No. CIV. A. 04002))).
32. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. Id. at 217.
34. Id.
35. See In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 196 F. App'x
93, 98 (3d Cir. 2006) (dismissing a Holocaust survivor's personal injury claims); see
also Gross v. German Found. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 391 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding
that despite an executive branch policy favoring nonjudicial resolution of
Holocaust-era claims, a claim seeking additional compensation did not pose a
political question); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 548 (9th Cir. 2005)
(applying the political question doctrine reasoning and ultimately determining that
only some of the Holocaust survivors' claims were justiciable).
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C. ForeignAffairs Preemption

The Constitution vests specific powers related to the conduct
of foreign affairs in the various branches of the federal
government, including the power to regulate foreign commerce,
declare war, make treaties, and hear cases involving ambassadors
and foreign states. 36 At the same time, it denies the states such
powers as the ability to enter into treaties or to collect duties on
imports or exports. 37 State law yields to federal law in the form of
the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties. 38 On this basis, courts
have invalidated state actions not in harmony with federal laws
and objectives concerning foreign relations. 39 A state law may be
preempted by a federal statute or treaty that conflicts with or
displaces the state law (statute or treaty preemption), 40 by
executive branch action that signals an intent to preempt the state
law (executive branch preemption),4 1 or by a judicial
determination that, even absent positive law or federal action, the
state law intrudes into an area that is expressly reserved to the
42
federal government (dormant foreign affairs preemption).

36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting the legislature the power to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and declare war); id. art. II, § 2 (granting the
executive the power to make treaties with advice and consent of Senate and to
appoint ambassadors); id. art. III, § 2 (granting the judiciary the power to hear
cases involving ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, and controversies
involving foreign states, citizens, and subjects).
37. Id. art. I, § 10 (denying states the power to make treaties or tax imports or
exports).
38. Id. art. VI, § 1.
39. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding a
state government procurement law, prohibiting state entities from purchasing
goods or services from companies doing business with Burma, was preempted by a
federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma); see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968) (holding a state statute governing inheritance rights of foreign citizens
was preempted by the federal foreign affairs power); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52 (1941) (holding a state alien registration statute was preempted by the federal
alien registration statute).
40. Crosby, 530 U.S. 363; Hines, 312 U.S. 52.
41. E.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding a California
statute requiring insurers to disclose information about wartime policies was
preempted by the executive branch policy of resolving Holocaust-era insurance
claims through nonjudicial international mechanisms). But cf. Presidential
Memorandum: Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20, 2009) (expressly directing
heads of executive departments and agencies not to preempt state law through
federal regulations without "full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the
States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption").
42. See, e.g., Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 441 ("Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a
[The state statute] has a direct
State's policy may disturb foreign relations ....
impact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the power of the
central government to deal with those problems.").
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Dormant foreign affairs preemption, the basis of Von Saher,
was established in 1968 in Zschernig v. Miller.43 In Zschernig, the
East German next-of-kin of an intestate Oregon decedent
challenged a Cold War-era Oregon statute limiting the rights of
44
foreign nationals to inherit property from state residents. The
Oregon Supreme Court, citing the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of a 1923 treaty between the United States and
Germany, held that the plaintiffs could inherit the real property
but not the personal property. 45 The Supreme Court, reversing, did
not revisit or rely on interpretation of the treaty. 46 Instead, it
found the statute unconstitutional because, by permitting "real or
imagined wrongs" to be inflicted on foreign subjects and by asking
courts to pass judgment on the administration of foreign law, the
statute risked disrupting the federal government's ability to carry
47
on foreign relations.
III. Holocaust-Related Litigation in the United States
Holocaust-related litigation in the United States can be
divided into four major types of restitution and compensation
claims: Swiss bank-related claims, forced labor claims, insurance
claims, and art claims. Each implicates foreign relations in a
different way.
A. Swiss Bank Litigation
Plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits in 1996 alleging that
Swiss banks had wrongfully retained and concealed the assets of
Holocaust victims, laundered funds for the Nazis, profited from the
war, and generally furthered Nazi objectives. 48 Settlement talks
began almost immediately, and the consolidated class actions were
settled in 2000 for $1.25 billion. 49 As of 2009, over $1 billion had
43. Id.
44. Id. at 430-31. The statute prevented inheritance of real or personal
property by citizens of nations that did not provide reciprocal inheritance rights to
U.S. citizens and citizens of nations where the proceeds of the estate could be seized
by the government. Id.
45. Id. at 431.
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 436, 440-41.
48. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd, Friedman v. Union Bank of Switz., 413 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2005).
49. Id. at 141, 166. See generally Melvyn 1. Weiss, A Litigator'sPostscriptto the

Swiss Banks and Holocaust Litigation Settlements: How Justice Was Served, in
HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY 103,

103-06 (Michael J. Bazyler & Roger P. Alford eds., 2006) (detailing the experiences
of one attorney who represented Holocaust victims during the litigation).
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been paid out to nearly 500,000 class members.5 0 Although the
bank litigation and settlement raised no preemption issues, 51 the
case had significant foreign policy implications,52 highlighting a
clash between the foreign policy objectives of the federal
government and those of the states. 53 Concurrent with the
diplomatic involvement of the State Department, approximately
twenty states and thirty municipalities enacted or threatened
some form of trade sanctions against Switzerland, 54 causing
tension not just between the Swiss government and the State
Department, but also between the State Department and state
governments.5 5 The Swiss refused to agree to a settlement until
the threats of sanctions were withdrawn.5 6 Also, in requiring
plaintiffs to release all unknown claims, the terms of the
settlement specifically limited certain state remedies.57 The
settlement required plaintiffs to waive their rights under any state
statute that prohibited general releases from applying to claims
5
unknown at the time of the release.
B. Human Rights and Slave Labor Litigation
Soon after the first bank-related suits were filed, other
plaintiffs sued German companies for their wartime exploitation of
slave labor.5 9 The German government, at the urging of German
industry, sought a diplomatic solution to limit its potential
liability. 60 The resulting German Foundation Agreement,
61
negotiated primarily between Germany and the United States,

50. Swiss BANKS SETTLEMENT: IN RE HOLOCAUST VICTIM ASSETS LITIG., SWISS
BANKS SETTLEMENT FUND DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009 1

(2009), http:llwww.swissbankclaims.comDocumentsNew/
Distribution%20Statistics.pdf.
51. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
52. Weiss, supra note 49, at 104-05.
53. David E. Sanger, McCall and State Dept. Clash on Sanctions Against Swiss
over Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1998, at B1.
54. Swiss Do Right Thing-Under Pressure,PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 16, 1998, at
E3.
55. Sanger, supra note 53, at 31.
56. John M. Goshko, Swiss Banks' Pact Ends N.Y Threat of Sanctions:
Holocaust Victims, Heirs Due Restitution, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1998, at A14.
57. Settlement Agreement § 12.2, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F.
Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (Nos. 96 Civ. 4849, 99 Civ. 5161, 97 Civ. 461),
availableat http://www.swissbankclaims.com/Documents/Doc_9_Settlement.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Weiss, supra note 49, at 106-08.
60. Id. at 106.
61. Aine Durkin, The German FoundationAgreement: A Nonexclusive Remedy
and Forum, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 575-76 (2008).
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was formalized in 2000.62 The German government and German
63
companies established a fund of 10.1 billion Deutsche Marks to
pay the compensation claims of those who had been forced to
work. 64 By 2007, the Foundation had completed its mission,
having disbursed just under 8.7 billion Deutsche Marks 65 to
66
approximately 1.66 million Holocaust victims.
The creation of the Foundation had implications for the
ability of individuals or classes to litigate their claims. In exchange
for Germany establishing the Foundation, the United States
agreed to file an advisory "Statement of Interest" in any related
domestic litigation, stating the federal interest in resolving claims
exclusively through the Foundation, and urging courts to dismiss
7
claims if there were any legal grounds for doing so.6
C. InsuranceLitigation
The class-action insurance claims began in 1997,68 based on
Holocaust-era policies that were either confiscated, never paid, or
paid over to the Nazi government at the Nazis' direction. 69 Within
a year, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners and
several insurance companies had formed a voluntary, nongovernmental association called The International Commission on

62. "A MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY AND A MORAL OBLIGATION:" THE FINAL REPORT
ON GERMANY'S

COMPENSATION

PROGRAMS

FOR

FORCED

LABOR

AND

OTHER

PERSONAL INJURIES 7 (Michael Jansen & Guinter Saathoff eds., 2009) [hereinafter
MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY].
63. Id. at 91.
64. Durkin, supranote 61, at 580.
65. MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 62, at 91.
66. Id. at 11.
67. Durkin, supra note 61, at 578; see also MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
62, at 56-64 (discussing the negotiations that created the Foundation). Courts used
varying legal grounds to dismiss claims against German companies in favor of
resolution through the Foundation. E.g., In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 196 F. App'x 93, 102 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal based on
the political question doctrine); Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d
1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for a German bank on
international comity grounds); see generally Durkin, supra note 61 (criticizing
courts for dismissing claims of Holocaust victims).
68. Lawrence Kill & Linda Gerstel, Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims:
Legislative, Judicial, and Executive Remedies, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY, supra note 49, at 239, 239.
69. LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER ET AL., FINDING CLAIMANTS AND PAYING THEM:
THE CREATION AND WORKINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST

ERA INSURANCE CLAIMS 8-9 (2007), availableat http://www.naic.org/Releases/
2007_docs/icheicbook_2007.pdf
(CInsurance policies were either directly
confiscated, or repurchased by their owners with the proceeds going into blocked
accounts that were ... subsequently seized by Nazi authorities.").
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Holocaust-Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC).70 ICHEIC was charged
with "establishing an international procedure for processing
'71
unpaid insurance policies held by victims of the Nazi regime.
The German Foundation Agreement incorporated ICHEIC,
72
providing that ICHEIC would handle insurance-related claims.
ICHEIC's settlement fund came partly from German insurance
companies and partly from the Foundation.7 3 As of March 2007,
ICHEIC had completed its mission, awarding $306 million to some
48,000 claimants, and committing $169 million to humanitarian
and social welfare programs for Holocaust survivors around the
74
world.
While the U.S. government was not a party to the
Memorandum of Understanding that established ICHEIC, the
executive branch nevertheless endorsed ICHEIC as a remedy, both
through its acceptance of the German Foundation Agreement
(which incorporated ICHEIC), and also in a similar subsequent
agreement with the Austrian government.7 5 But ICHEIC was
criticized by many as inept, 76 and some U.S. courts, finding
ICHEIC an inadequate alternate forum, explicitly refused to
77
dismiss insurance-related actions.

70. Id. at 18-19.
71. Kai Hennig, The Road to Compensation of Life Insurance Policies: The
FoundationLaw and ICHEIC, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY, supra note 49, at 251, 251.
72. Id. at 252.
73. Id. at 251-52.
74. ICHEIC, About ICHEIC, http://www.icheic.org/about.html (last visited Mar.
4, 2010).
75. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) ("[The national
position, expressed unmistakably in the executive agreements signed by the
President with Germany and Austria, has been to encourage European insurers to
work with the ICHEIC to develop acceptable claim procedures ....");
Anderman v.
Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ("[Tlhe executive branch's
position [is that these] claims . . . should be adjudicated within the claims
procedure of [ICHEIC] ....
").
76. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 432-33 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing
ICHEIC's shortcomings); Kill & Gerstel, supra note 68, at 241-48; Sidney
Zabludoff, ICHEIC: Excellent Concept but Inept Implementation, in HOLOCAUST
RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY, supra note 49, at
260, 260-67 (claiming ICHEIC was plagued by "inept management and
governance").
77. E.g., In re Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. Holocaust Ins. Litig., 228 F. Supp.
2d 348, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("A private, nonprofit association is not entitled to the
deference that is accorded a public adjudicative or administrative organ of a
sovereign state."); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., Nos.
1337, 98-4104, Civ. 01-5862, 2002 WL 31454184, at *3 (D.N.J. June 5, 2002)
(calling ICHEIC "a questionable alternative remedy" and refusing to dismiss
claims).
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D. Looted Art Litigation and U.S. Policy
From a legal standpoint, Holocaust victims seeking the
return of works of art lost during the war face particular obstacles
and disadvantages. For all the works of art repatriated to various
European governments after the war, 78 many others were never
79
recovered by the Allies, and their whereabouts remain unknown.
Some were auctioned off publicly by the Nazis or at their
direction,8 0 while others slipped more quietly into the
international art market.8 1 Even assuming a work could be found,
claimants may then face special problems of proof.8 2 While actual
litigation between a museum and a claimant is relatively rare
(most claims are resolved through private negotiations),8 3 U.S.
courts have seen a steady stream of claims for the restitution of
85
works of art,8 4 including claims for works in foreign collections.
The first Holocaust-related art lawsuit 6 in the United States
was filed in 1996 against a Chicago collector in possession of a
work by Edgar Degas.8 7 The plaintiffs were the grandsons of Dutch

78. See PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S.,

supranote 14, at SR-143; see also PALMER, supra note 9, at 124.
79. Nicholas, supra note 22, at 450-51.
80. See NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 3-5 (describing a 1939 auction of art from
German museums).
81. Nicholas, supra note 22, at 450-51.
82. ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., ART MUSEUMS AND THE IDENTIFICATION AND
RESTITUTION OF WORKS STOLEN BY THE NAzIS 2 (2007), available at

http://www.aamd.org/papers/documents/Nazi-lootedart clean06_2007.pdf
("Ownership records are often incomplete, wartime documents may have been
destroyed, and standards of record keeping have changed over time.").
83. For selected cases and their current statuses, see Stephen W. Clark, World
War 11 Restitution Cases, in LEGAL ISSUES IN MUSEUM ADMINISTRATION 371, 371400 (2009) (listing seventy-eight current and pending claims in the United States
and abroad).
84. Id.
85. For example, following Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004), which held
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could create jurisdiction over foreign
governments in actions to recover for Holocaust-looted art, the Austrian
government returned five paintings to a California resident, the niece of the Jewish
Austrian collector who left the paintings behind when he fled Austria. Richard
Bernstein, Austrian Panel Backs Return of Klimt Works, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006,
at E3. Pending is a claim against the Spanish government for a painting allegedly
extorted from the plaintiffs grandmother in 1939 in exchange for permission to
leave Germany. Cassirer v. Spain, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g granted, 590 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc).
86. HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES

ON THE LITIGATION

AND ITS

LEGACY, supra note 49, at xiii.
87. Goodman v. Searle, No. 96-CV-6459 (N.D. Ill. dismissed Aug. 19, 1998)
(Westlaw, Dockets, U.S. Dist. Ct.IlH., N'ern). The case was originally filed in New
York, then transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. Complaint, Goodman,
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Jews whose collection was seized by the Nazis, and who later died
at Auschwitz and Theresienstadt.8 8 Before trial, the parties agreed
to divide ownership of the work, and it resides now in the Art
Institute of Chicago. 89 The dispute garnered national attention
and fueled awareness concerning the problem of looted art,
including the realization that many works had likely ended up not
only in U.S. private collections, but also in public museums. 90
As part of the post-Cold War revival of interest in the subject,
Congress created a Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets to "examine issues pertaining to the disposition
of Holocaust-era assets in the [United States] before, during, and
after World War II, and to make recommendations to the
President on further action. ..."91 The U.S. State Department
convened the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets in
1998, assembling representatives of forty-four governments and
numerous non-governmental organizations to share information
and discuss solutions to the continuing problem of restoring lost
92
property to the victims of the Holocaust and their heirs.
This conference produced the non-binding Washington
Principles, outlining eleven concrete steps that included the goal of
"expeditiously... achiev[ing] a just and fair solution" to the
problem of Nazi-looted art.93 Both leading up to and as a result of
the Washington Conference, a number of domestic organizations
took measures to facilitate claims for looted artwork. 94 These
included then New York Governor George Pataki's establishment
of the Holocaust Claims Processing Office in 1997, 95 the
No. 96-CIV-5310 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1996); Consent Order, Goodman, No. 96-CIV5310 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1996).
88. Dispute Over Degas Resolved: Museum to Get Painting Allegedly Taken by
Nazis, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1998, at D4.
89. Id. The plaintiffs' lawyer acknowledged the settlement as "an elegant
solution for a difficult problem" involving "two sets of victims:" the family originally
dispossessed and the present-day good-faith purchaser. Id.
90. See Walter V. Robinson, An Ignominious Legacy: Evidence Grows of
PlunderedArt in U.S., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1997, at Al.
91. U.S. Holocaust Assets Commission Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-186, 112
Stat. 611.
92. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE ON HOLOCAUST-ERA ASSETS: PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 8, at 949, 949-70 for a list of participants in the Washington
Conference.
93. Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-Confiscated Art, supra note 8, at
972.
94. Stuart E. Eizenstat, The Unfinished Business of the Unfinished Business of
World War II, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND

ITS LEGACY, supra note 49, at 297, 308.
95. Monica S. Dugot, The Holocaust Claims ProcessingOffice: New York State's
Approach to Resolving Holocaust-Era Art Claims, in HOLOCAUST RESTITUTION:
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promulgation by
professional
museum
organizations
of
recommended guidelines and policies for handling Holocaustrelated claims,9 6 efforts by U.S. museums to research and publish
the ownership history of their collections, 97 and the increased use
98
of international databases to record information about stolen art.
IV. Holocaust-Related Litigation in the Ninth Circuit: The
Cases Leading to Von Saher
The line of Ninth Circuit cases that culminates in Von Saher
is a microcosm of the broader landscape of Holocaust-related
litigation, implicating all four types of claims described above, as
well as the range of limits on state and judicial resolution of such
claims. Deutsch v. Turner99 involved a Hungarian Jew who, with
his brother, became a Nazi prisoner in 1944 and was forced to
work as a slave laborer for German industry. 00 In 2000, pursuant
to a then-new California statute,101 Deutsch sued the U.S.
subsidiaries of a German corporation for personal injuries and the
wrongful death of his brother. 10 2 The district court dismissed the
case as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. 0 3 The Ninth
PERSPECTIVES ON THE LITIGATION AND ITS LEGACY, supra note 49, at 271, 272.

96. See, e.g., AM. ASS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11; ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM
DIRS., REPORT OF THE AAMD TASK FORCE ON THE SPOLIATION OF ART DURING THE
NAZIIWORLD WAR II ERA (1933-1945) (1998), http://www.aamd.org/papers/

guideln.php (outlining museums' self-imposed recommendations for handling art
associated with Holocaust and World War II transactions); Press Release, Int'l
Council of Museums, ICOM Recommendations Concerning the Return of Works of
Art Belonging
to
Jewish
Owners
(Jan. 14,
1999)
(available at
http://icom.museum/worldwar2.html) (publicizing museums' good faith efforts to
research ownership and return artwork to its proper owners).
97. See Nazi-Era Provenance Internet Portal, http://www.nepip.org (last visited
Feb. 17, 2010). The Portal is a searchable database of works of art that changed
hands in Europe during the war, from the collections of 166 participating
museums. Id. The database was created by the American Association of Museums
in response to the Washington Principles' direction to create a centralized registry
of information. See Ass'n of Art Museum Dirs.,
Object Registry,
http://aamdobjectregistry.orgNazi-Era (last visited Mar. 4, 2010).
98. See International Council of Museums, http://icom.museuml
spoliation.html#databases (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (listing online databases that
hold information on looted art).
99. 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 704.
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 2006) (creating a private right of action
for World War II slave labor victims and extending the statute of limitations to the
end of 2010), invalidatedby Deutsch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
102. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 704.
103. See Deutsch v. Turner, No. CV 00-4405, 2000 WL 33957691 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2000), aff'd, 317 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2003), amended and superseded on denial
of reh'g by 324 F.3d 692. The Court's reasoning mirrored that of Baker v. Carr,369
U.S. 186, 210 (1962). See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, although clearly troubled by Deutsch's
plight and the injustice he had suffered, agreed that the action
should be dismissed, and "reluctantly" affirmed. 104 Rather than
finding a political question, however, the Ninth Circuit Court
invalidated the California statute on foreign affairs preemption
grounds.10 5 Because the Supreme Court had recently granted
06
certiorari in American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,1
which
implicated the same broad issue, the Deutsch court stayed its
10 7
mandate pending Garamendi'soutcome.
Garamendi involved a challenge by a group of U.S. and
European insurance companies to another California law, the
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA).1 08 HVIRA
sought to facilitate Holocaust victims' recovery of assets by
requiring insurers doing business in California to disclose
information about policies in effect in Europe between 1920 and
1945.109 The district court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary
injunction
on
the
grounds
that
HVIRA
was
likely
unconstitutional.' 10 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the argument that HVIRA was preempted by the foreign affairs
power,1 11 but remanded for a determination of possible due process
violations. 112 After remand, on the second appeal, the Court
reiterated its holding that foreign affairs preemption did not
apply, 113 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the
question. 1 4 The Supreme Court reversed, in a 5-4 decision,
holding that HVIRA was preempted by the foreign affairs
power.1 15 The Court relied in part on the fact that the German
Foundation Agreement, as well as the subsequent separate
11 6
executive agreement between the United States and Austria,

104. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 704.
105. Id. at 708-16.
106. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), rev'g Gerling Global
Reins. Co. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002).
107. Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 703.
108. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 412, 420, invalidatingCAL. INS. CODE §§ 13800-07
(West 2006).
109. CAL. INS. CODE § 13804, invalidated by Garamendi,539 U.S. at 412, 420.
110. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 412.
111. Id. (citing Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739,
754 (9th Cir. 2001)).
112. Gerling, 240 F.3d at 754.
113. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 296 F.3d 832 (9th Cir.
2002).
114. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 413.
115. Id. at 413-20.
116. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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provided specifically that ICHEIC was the agreed upon remedy for
Holocaust-era insurance claims. 117 Despite the fact that this direct
conflict between an expressed federal policy and the statute at
issue was sufficient to find express preemption,"18 the Court's
analysis relied heavily on Zschernig, and Garamendi has
consequently been interpreted as an endorsement of the dormant
foreign affairs preemption doctrine." 19
Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
invoked the political question doctrine to dismiss claims of
Holocaust survivors in Alperin v. Vatican Bank. 120 Alperin
involved a suit against the Vatican Bank for property and human
rights claims alleging crimes committed under the Ustasha
Regime, a Nazi puppet government in Croatia. 21 The property
claims were related to gold and other assets allegedly
misappropriated during the war. 122 The human rights claims
alleged war crimes, including forcing plaintiffs to work as slave
laborers. 23 As in Deutsch, the district court in Alperin applied
Baker and dismissed all claims as presenting nonjusticiable
political questions. 24 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
in part and affirmed in part, holding that only the human rights
claims warranted dismissal as presenting nonjusticiable political
questions. 125 On remand, the district court dismissed the property
claims based on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the
26
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

117. Id. at 406-08.
118. Id. at 425.
119. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ('The Court's analysis draws
substantially on Zschernig v. Miller... I would not resurrect that decision here.");
Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
Garamendi as an application of Zschernig), amended and superseded on denial of
reh'g en banc by No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010); see
Nicholas P. Martinelli, Constitutional Law-Foreign Affairs Power Preempts
CaliforniaLaw: National Government to Resolve Holocaust-EraInsurance ClaimsAmerican Insurance Association v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003), 38 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 945 (2005) (arguing that the Court's reliance on Zschernig was misplaced).
120. Alperin v. Vatican Bank (Alperin 1), 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'g
Alperin v. Vatican Bank, C99-4941, 2003 WL 21303209 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2003),
aff'g in part and rev'g in part 242 F.Supp.2d 686 (N.D. Cal. 2003), amending 405
F.3d 727 (9th Cir. 2005).
121. Id. at 538.
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id. at 543-44.
124. Alperin, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 695, rev'd in part and aff'd in part, Alperin II,
410 F.3d 532.
125. Alperin II, 410 F.3d at 548, 558-59.
126. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, No. 08-16060, 2009 WL 5196077 (9th Cir. Dec. 29,
2009) (mem.), aff'g No. C-99-04941, 2007 WL 4570674 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2007),
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V. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum
The historical events that culminated in Von Saher are
unusually well-documented and demonstrate the myriad complex
issues implicated by Holocaust-related art claims.
A. History of the Disputed Paintings
Adam and Eve are two large and important panel paintings
by the sixteenth century German painter Lucas Cranach the
Elder. 127 Painted as a pair around 1530, most likely for a member
of the Saxon court of Frederick 111,128 their subsequent
whereabouts were undocumented until 1927, when they were
found hidden in a church in Kiev, Ukraine. 129 After the pictures
surfaced, the Bolshevik (later Soviet) government that seized
power in the Communist revolution of 1917-18 "nationalized" the
paintings as state property.1 30 In 1931, the Soviets consigned both
paintings, along with more than 250 other works, together labeled
as "the Stroganoff Collection Leningrad," to a Berlin auction
house.131
The Stroganoffs were art collectors and one of Russia's
preeminent noble families. 132 They fled Russia in the wake of the
revolution, and the Soviet government nationalized their property,
including much of their art collection. 133 Upon learning of the
pending 1931 Berlin auction, members of the exiled family
formally and publicly protested the sale, but were unsuccessful in

amended in part by No. 08-16060, 2010 WL 489495 (9th Cir. Feb. 10, 2010).
127. Norton
Simon
Museum,
Online
catalogue
record
for
Eve,
http://www.nortonsimon.org/collectionsbrowse-title.php?id=M. 1991.1.P
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2010; Norton Simon Museum, Online catalogue record for Adam,
http://www.nortonsimon.org/collections/highlights.php?period=14H&resultnum=27
(last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
128. Norton
Simon
Museum,
Online
catalogue
record
for
Eve,
http://www.nortonsimon.org/collections/browse-title.php?id=M.1991.1.P
(last
visited Feb. 15, 2010; Norton Simon Museum, Online catalogue record for Adam,
http://www.nortonsimon.org/collections/highlights.php?period=14H&resultnum=27
(last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
129. Complaint at 8, Norton Simon Art Found. v. Von Saher, No. CV07-02850
(C.D. Cal. May 1, 2007) [hereinafter Norton Simon Complaint].
130. Id.
131. Muchnic, supra note 4, at D14.
132. See generally Sergei Kuznetsov, Family Chronicle, in STROGANOFF: THE
PALACE AND COLLECTIONS OF A RuSsIAN NOBLE FAMILY at 21, 21-46 (Penelope
Hunter-Stiebel ed., 2000); Militsa Korshunova, The Stroganoff Collectors, in
STROGANOFF: THE PALACE AND COLLECTIONS OF A RusSIAN NOBLE FAMILY at 77,
77-87 (Penelope Hunter-Stiebel ed., 2000) (chronicling the history of the Stroganoff
family and the accumulation of their prodigious art collection).
133. Norton Simon Complaint, supranote 129, at 9.
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halting it.134 At the sale, Jacques Goudstikker, an Amsterdam
Jew, the Von Saher plaintiffs father-in-law and by then a
135
successful art dealer, purchased Adam and Eve for his gallery.
Adam and Eve were two of the approximately 1400 works of art
still in Goudstikker's gallery inventory on May 14, 1940, when
Goudstikker fled Nazi-occupied Holland for England with his wife
and infant son. 36 Goudstikker died en route to England in a freak
accident involving a fall. 137 Within weeks of Goudstikker's death,
Hitler's second in command, Hermann G6ring, had visited the
abandoned gallery and "purchased" its inventory, including Adam
and Eve, for himself, while leaving the business and various other
real and personal property with an associate. 138 After the war, the
Allies recovered the paintings in Germany among hundreds of
others that Goring had amassed during the conflict, and
39
repatriated them to the Dutch government.'
B. Adjudication of Claims by the Dutch Government
Even before the end of the war, the Dutch government, from
its exile in London, had issued a royal order to facilitate the
recovery and restitution of looted property, and established a
council to administer claims. 40 After the war, Jacques
Goudstikker's widow, Desi, pressed claims for the return of the
property that had been taken, and recovered a portion of it-but
not the paintings taken by G6ring-from the Dutch government in
134. $157,080 Paid in Berlin for Two Van Dycks: Stroganoff Collection Auction
Nets $476,000 for FirstDay-PrincessFails to Halt Sale, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1931,
at 22.
135. Muchnic, supra note 4, at D14.
136. Id.; NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 84.
137. NICHOLAS, supra note 9, at 84. Goudstikker and his wife were escaping a
Nazi invasion of the Netherlands via boat, but were denied entrance to Great
Britain. Id. Before the ship could sail again, Goudstikker went on a walk to "have
some fresh air" on the deck, where he "missed his footing and f[ell] to his death
through an uncovered hatch." Id. See also Yehudit Shendar & Niv Goldberg, The
Insatiable Pursuitof Art: The Jacques Goudstikker Collection and Nazi Art Looting,
in RECLAIMED: PAINTINGS FROM THE COLLECTION OF JACQUES GOUDSTIKKER at 35,

39 (Peter C. Sutton ed., 2008).
138. Lawrence M. Kaye, The Restitution of the Goudstikker Collection, in
RECLAIMED: PAINTINGS FROM THE COLLECTION OF JACQUES GOUDSTIKKER, supra

note 137, at 55, 57.
139. Id. at 57-58.
140. Besluit van 17 September 1944, houdende vaststelling van het Besluit
herstel rechtsverkeer [Order for the Restoration of Legal Rights], Stb. E100 (1944)
(Neth.); see also PALMER, supra note 9, at 124; Anna B. Rubin, Dir. Holocaust
Claims Processing Office, N.Y. State Banking Dep't, Address at the Holocaust Era
Assets Conference: Presumptions: Applying Lessons Learned from Compensation
Programs
(June
26-30,
2009)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.banking.state.ny.us/sp090627.pd).
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1952.141 Subsequently, the Dutch government sold some unclaimed
artworks, including some of the Goudstikker-owned paintings that
Goring had taken. 142 In 1961, George Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, the
heir to the Stroganoff dynasty and a naturalized U.S. citizen,
petitioned the Dutch government for the return of Adam and Eve
on the basis of his family's dispossession by the Soviet
government. 143 In 1966, the Dutch government settled his claim,
giving the paintings to Stroganoff-Scherbatoff in exchange for a
monetary payment. 144 Stroganoff-Scherbatoff, in turn, sold the
paintings through a dealer to the Norton Simon Museum in 1970
and 1971.145
Desi Goudstikker and her son Edo both died in 1996, leaving
Edo's widow, Marei Von Saher, as Jacques Goudstikker's only
surviving heir. 146 In 1998, responding to the Dutch government's
renewed receptiveness to Holocaust-era claims, Von Saher made
claims for all Goudstikker artworks still in the hands of the Dutch
government. 147 In 2006, after protracted negotiations and changes
in Dutch policy, the Dutch government returned 200 works to Von
Saher.148
C. Von Saher's Claim Against the Museum
The conflict between Marei Von Saher and the Norton Simon
Museum began in February 2001, when she contacted the museum
and asserted her ownership of Adam and Eve. 149 The museum
refused to concede its ownership but agreed to enter into
141. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 17. The significance of the
1952 settlement for Von Saher's present claim is disputed. According to the Norton
Simon's complaint, Desi Goudstikker, on advice from her attorneys, decided not to
pursue restitution of the paintings purchased by Goring, and under the Dutch
system, her claim had lapsed in 1951. Id. at 13-17. Von Saher's attorney, on the
other hand, contends that the Dutch government's "legalistic, bureaucratic, cold,
and often even callous" handling of post-war claims made it impossible for Desi
Goudstikker to recover all of her property. Kaye, supra note 138, at 58.
142. Answering Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 16, Von Saher v. Norton Simon
Museum, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-56691). See also ORIGINS UNKNOWN
ADVISORY COMM., FINAL REPORT: RECOMMENDATION 5(b) (2004), available at
http://www.herkomstgezocht.nlleng/rapportage/index.html
(unpaginated English
translation as well as paginated Dutch original) (acknowledging the 1950s auctions
and the impossibility of accurately accounting for works sold).
143. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 18.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 19.
146. Complaint at 8, Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, No. CV07-02866 (C.D.
Cal. May 1, 2007) [hereinafter Von Saher Complaint].
147. Kaye, supra note 138, at 59.
148. Id.
149. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 29.
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mediation talks. 150 Following the breakdown of these talks, the
museum and Von Saher filed simultaneous actions in district
court, each side seeking, among other things, a declaratory
151
judgment affirming ownership.
Von Saher brought her claim under section 354.3 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, 152 which provided that the
owners of works of art taken by the Nazis, or the owner's heirs,
could bring actions against museums and galleries to recover those
works until the end of 2010.153 The district court, relying on
Deutsch v. Turner,5 4 dismissed Von Saher's claims with prejudice,
finding the statute preempted by the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine and the claims time-barred under the normal statute of
limitations for the recovery of stolen property. 55 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, while section 354.3
posed no direct conflict with any current federal policy, 1 56 it was
nevertheless subject to "field" preemption analysis because the
157
statute did not concern a "traditional state responsibility."
Under a field preemption analysis, any intrusion into the realm of
foreign affairs, a field occupied exclusively by the federal
government, would result in preemption. 5 Despite holding
section 354.3 preempted, the Court of Appeals questioned the
district court's holding as to the validity of the claim under the
normal California statute of limitations and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 59 The dissent, however, argued that the
statute did in fact concern a traditional state responsibility, and
60
that "conflict," rather than "field," preemption should apply.
Under Garamendi, the dissent argued, a conflict preemption

150. Id.
151. Id.; Von Saher Complaint, supra note 146.
152. Section 354.3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is substantially
similar, but not identical, to section 354.6, the statute held unconstitutional in
Deutsch. See full text and discussion, infra Part VI.B.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2006), invalidated by Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art, No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, No. CV 07-2866-JFW, 2007 WL
4302726, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part No. 07-56691,
2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010) (en banc).
154. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
155. Von Saher, 2007 WL 4302726, at *3-4.
156. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016, 1025 (9th Cir. 2009),
amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc by No. 07-56691, 2010 WL
114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010).
157. Id. at 1027.
158. Id. at 1029.
159. Id. at 1031.
160. Id. at 1031-32 (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting).
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analysis would balance a state's interest in performing a
traditional state responsibility against the impact of that state
action on foreign relations.1 6 1 The dissent would have found that
the state interest outweighed the impact on foreign relations and
reversed the district court.162
VI. Von Saher and the Misuse of Dormant Foreign Affairs
Preemption
Even if the claim can be brought within the regular statute of
limitations, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum seems to require that it
ultimately be dismissed on other grounds. The case involves
reexamining and passing judgment upon a post-war restitution
decision made by a sovereign nation with the implicit endorsement
of the U.S. government, and as such either poses a nonjusticiable
political question or is unreviewable under the act of state
doctrine.1 63 These problems, however, have nothing to do with any
special statute of limitations, rather, they arise from the particular
facts of Von Saher.164 Comparing the different claims at issue in
Deutsch, Garamendi, and Von Saher165-and the differing levels of
federal involvement in the resolution of slave labor, insurance, and
art claims166-it is clear that the dormant foreign affairs
preemption doctrine should not apply to California Code of Civil
Procedure section 354.3. The Court should have left the special
statute of limitations created by statute intact and dismissed the
case for prudential reasons.
A. Art Cases PresentDifferent Foreign Policy Issues than
Banking, Forced Labor, or Insurance Claims
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged in Von
Saher that the federal government's policy regarding the recovery
of works of art misappropriated during World War II has not been

161. Id.; see Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 420 (2003).
162. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1031-32 (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting). See also
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 458-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result) ("Prior decisions have established that in the absence of a conflicting federal
policy or violation of the express mandates of the Constitution the States may
legislate in areas of their traditional competence even though their statutes may
have an incidental effect on foreign relations.").
163. See supra Parts I.A-B.
164. See supra Parts V.A-B.
165. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003); Garamendi, 539
U.S. 396; Von Saher, 578 F.3d 1016.
166. See supra Parts III.B-D, IVA.
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so clearly articulated as to warrant preempting state action in this
16 7
arena on the basis of any direct conflict with federal policy.
Federal policy with respect to Holocaust-era art claims has never
been unequivocally stated-as with the slave labor and insurance
claims-nor is it inextricably bound up with foreign policy-as
with the banking claims. 168 Art claims, unlike the forced labor,
insurance, and banking claims, 169 do not lend themselves to a
government-driven mass resolution through a vehicle like the
German Foundation Agreement or ICHEIC.170 Because artwork
has been dispersed throughout the world, there is no single
present possessor, government, or industry that can be held
accountable. 171 The rights and obligations of innocent parties now
in possession of disputed works are implicated, including the
obligations of museums-as fiduciaries holding their collections in
trust for the public-to diligently investigate claims.172 Further,
the U.S. government's actions in the late 1990s1 73 do not amount to
a clear foreign policy position regarding the resolution of art
claims, but instead are merely a recognition that works should be
returned where appropriate. 74 The convening of the Washington
Conference 75 was a major undertaking, and the Washington
Principles have been influential in shaping domestic behavior and
policy. 76 The Principles are non-binding, however, and express no
unequivocal preference for a particular method or forum for claim
resolution-to the contrary, "the Conference recognizes that

167. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1024-25 ("[Section 354.3] does not ... conflict with
any current foreign policy espoused by the Executive Branch.").
168. See supra Part III.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 61-62, 65-70, and accompanying text.
171. In addition, the private status of most U.S. museums precludes government
intervention. J. Christian Kennedy, Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues, Remarks:
The Role of the United States Government in Art Restitution (Apr. 23, 2007)
(transcript available at http://germany.usembassy.gov/kennedy-speech.html)
("While the government can urge institutions to participate voluntarily in programs
[facilitating resolution of claims], the government does not have any leverage to
force compliance .... ).
172. AM. AS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11, at 7 ("Museums ... hold their
collections in the public trust .... Their stewardship duties and their
responsibilities to the public they serve require that any decision to ... dispose of
objects be taken only after the completion of appropriate steps and careful
consideration.").
173. See supraPart III.D.
174. See Kennedy, supra note 171 ('We continue as a government to urge that
foreign governments and institutions observe the Washington Principles and
return artworks to their rightful owners.").
175. See supra Part III.D.
176. Eizenstat, supra note 94, at 308.
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among participating nations there are differing legal systems and
that countries act within the context of their own laws. '177 The
178
latest global conference on the subject of Holocaust-era assets
reaffirmed the international community's commitment to the
Washington Principles, but again did not call for the creation of
any kind of international, non-judicial forum for the resolution of
looted art claims.1 79 Instead, the Working Group on Looted Art
recommended that those countries that had not already done so
should establish "national claims procedures for fair and just
solutions encompassing decisions on their merits, i.e., on a moral
basis, and not on technical defences such as the passage of
180
time."
The federal government's involvement in the international
resolution of Holocaust-era banking, forced labor, and insurance
claims, by contrast, included the articulation of and commitment
to a particular position with respect to other nations. In the Swiss
bank litigation settlement negotiations, that position put the
federal government at odds with several individual states.' 8 ' In
the case of the forced labor and insurance claims, the federal
government endorsed specific nonjudicial remedies, and courts
recognized the federal interest in recourse to the German
18 2
Foundation and ICHEIC, respectively, as official foreign policy.
B.

Section 354.3 is Not Facially Unconstitutional

Section 354.3 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the owners of works of art taken by the Nazis, or the
owners' heirs, can bring actions against museums and galleries to
recover those works until the end of 2010.183 The Ninth Circuit
177. Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-ConfiscatedArt, supra note 8, at
971.
178. The Holocaust Era Assets Conference convened June 26-30, 2009, in
Prague, Czech Republic. Holocaust Era Assets Conference, Prague, Czech Rep.,
June 26-30, 2009, http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
Then-Secretary of State Stuart E. Eizenstat, the official envoy on Holocaust issues
in the Clinton administration, who was deeply involved in the German Foundation
negotiations, led the U.S. delegation. Id; see MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
62, at 56-64.
179. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, TEREZIN DECLARATION 4-5 (2009),

availableat http://www.holocausteraassets.eu/files/200000215-35d8efla36/
TEREZIN_DECLARATIONFINAL.pdf.
180. HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, EXPERT CONCLUSIONS 19 (2009),

availableat http://www.holocausteraassets.eulfiles/200000201-62aOcaabb3
ExpertConclusions.pdf.
181. See supra Part III.A.
182. See supra Parts III.B-C; see also supra note 75.
183. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3 (West 2006), invalidated by Von Saher v.
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Court of Appeals in Von Saher, relying on its earlier holding in
Deutsch and applying the doctrine of dormant foreign affairs
preemption, invalidated the statute. 184 Considering the nature of
Holocaust-era art claims compared to slave labor claims, however,
section 354.3 does not suffer from the same constitutional
shortcomings as section 354.6, the statute invalidated in
185
Deutsch.
Section 354.3 provides, in relevant part:
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any owner, or
heir or beneficiary of an owner, of Holocaust-era artwork, may
bring an action to recover Holocaust-era artwork from any
[museum or gallery] described ....
(c) Any action brought under this section shall not be
dismissed for failure to comply with the applicable statute of
limitation, if the action is commenced on or before December
31, 2010.186

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged in Von Saher
that in theory the purpose of the statute-the resolution of
property claims-could represent a legitimate state interest and
traditional state function. 187 But the court found that the statute
was so broad in scope as to belie its purported goal of protecting
the property rights of California residents, and thus it could no8
'1 8
longer claim to address a "traditional state responsibility."
Further, the court found that the statute shared the same
underlying "fatal" motive as the Deutsch statute, i.e., "'redress[ing]
wrongs committed in the course of the Second World War."' 18 9 As
such, the statute encroached impermissibly "into a field occupied
exclusively by the federal government." 190 The Von Saher dissent,
on the other hand, argued that because the regulation of property
is a traditional state function, state action should not be
preempted absent a clear conflict with federal policy. 191
Norton Simon Museum of Art, No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14,
2010) (en banc).
184. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016, 1027-29 (9th Cir.

2009), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc by No. 07-56691, 2010
WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010).
185. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6 (West 2006), invalidated by Deutsch v.
Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003).
186. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 354.3, invalidated by Von Saher, 2010 WL 114959.
Section 354.3 is substantially similar, but not identical, to section 354.6, the statute
held unconstitutional in Deutsch. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6, invalidated by
Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 692.
187. Von Saher, 578 F.3d at 1025-26.
188. Id. at 1027.
189. Id. (quoting Deutsch, 324 F.3d at 712).
190. Id. at 1029.
191. Id. at 1032 (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting) ("Because California has a 'serious
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While it is theoretically possible that a modern-day museum
or gallery might have some direct responsibility for the original
wartime confiscation, theft, forced sale, or other misappropriation
of a work in its collection, section 354.3 is far more likely to
encompass innocent purchasers and donation recipients that, like
the Norton Simon Museum, either had no involvement with the
misappropriation or believed that restitution had been made prior
to acquisition. 192 Moreover, with section 354.3's definition of
"Holocaust-era artwork" as any work "taken as a result of Nazi
persecution," and its failure to exclude works taken, restituted,
and then lawfully sold or donated, the statute would technically
also encompass completely spurious restitution claims brought by
persons who had objects returned to them and then willingly
parted with the works of art. 193 It seems highly unlikely that the
California legislature meant to create such an absurd cause of
action. Rather, the statute is procedural in nature, "extend[ing]
the statute of limitations for claims against museums and galleries
currently in possession of [Holocaust-era artworks] ."194
The statute at issue in Deutsch, on the other hand, sought to
create a substantive right, and arguably failed under either a
conflict or field preemption analysis. 195 Section 354.6 directly
conflicts with expressed federal foreign policy providing that the
preferred remedy for Holocaust-era slave labor claims was the
196
mechanism established by the German Foundation agreement.
Furthermore, by targeting former wartime enemies, the statute at
issue in Deutsch plainly addresses an area of federal
competence. 197 As the Deutsch court reasoned, California "sought
to create its own resolution to a major issue arising out of the
war-a remedy for wartime acts that California's legislature
believed had never been fairly resolved,"' 198 and that remedy was
claim to be addressing a traditional state responsibility,' it is clear that Garamendi
requires us to apply conflict preemption, not field preemption.").
192. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 19-20.
193. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.3(2) (West 2006), invalidated by Von
Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc). Compare Washington Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated
Art, supra note 8, at 971 (combining the painstakingly qualifying phrase
"confiscated by the Nazis" with "and not subsequently restituted') with AM. ASS'N
OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11 (consistently using "unlawfully appropriated" and
"without subsequent restitution').
194. Brief for Appellant at 16, Von Saher, 578 F.3d 1016 (No. 07-56691); Von
Saher, 578 F.3d at 1032 (Pregerson, C.J., dissenting).
195. Deutsch v. Turner, 324 F.3d 692, 715-16 (9th Cir. 2003).
196. Id. at 713-14.
197. Id. at 712.
198. Id.
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an impermissible intrusion on "the federal government's exclusive
power to make and resolve war, including the procedure for
resolving war claims." 199 The Von Saher dissent distinguished
slave labor claims under section 354.6 from art claims under
section 354.3, agreeing with Von Saher's argument that, because
the latter statute neither targeted former enemies of the United
States, nor sought to provide war reparations, it did not intrude on
200
any federal prerogative.
C. DormantForeign Affairs PreemptionDoctrine Is
Inapplicableto Section 354.3
Between 1968, when the Supreme Court articulated the
principles of dormant foreign affairs preemption in Zschernig, and
2003, when it decided Garamendi, the Court never invalidated a
state action based on dormant foreign affairs preemption. 2 1 Nor
20 2
was the 5-4 Garamendi decision a full embrace of the doctrine.
In Garamendi, there was ample evidence to support the finding
that the federal government, acting through the executive branch,
had established a clear policy with respect to the resolution of
Holocaust-era insurance claims. 20 3 This evidence alone, in the
majority's opinion, sufficed to invalidate HVIRA, the California
disclosure statute at issue. 20 4 Because the Court found that
HVIRA stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
executive branch's clearly stated policy and practice, the Court
found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether, in the
absence of any clearly articulated federal policy, a state action that
addresses a traditional state responsibility must nevertheless be
20 5
invalidated.

199. Id.
200. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum, 578 F.3d 1016, 1032 (Pregerson, C.J.,
dissenting) ("I fail to see how [this statute] intrudes on the federal government's
power to make and resolve war."), amended and superseded on denial of reh'g en
banc by No. 07-56691, 2010 WL 114959 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010).
201. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 439 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided .. ");Gerling
Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 752 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[The
Supreme Court has not applied [dormant foreign affairs preemption] in more than
30 years, since Zschernig .. "),rev'd sub nom. Garamendi,539 U.S. 396.
202. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 400.
203. Id. at 420-25 (detailing federal interest in and endorsement of ICHEIC as
an exclusive remedy).
204. Id. at 425 ('The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the
state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.").
205. Id. at 419-20.
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Thus, Garamendi did not shed much light on how to balance
legitimate, articulated state interests against potential harm to
theoretical, unarticulated federal interests. 206 In the decision
Garamendireversed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held
that Zschernig should not be applied to statutes that are not
facially unconstitutional. 20 7 The Court of Appeals had applied a
balancing test and found that HVIRA did not have enough of an
impact on foreign relations to invoke the foreign affairs
preemption doctrine, nor did it have "the potential to 'disrupt and
embarrass' the federal government in the field of foreign
relations."208 Similarly, the Garamendi dissent found Zschernig
inapposite, particularly where the state action or policy at issue
"takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and
requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime." 20 9 The
Garamendi dissent further noted that, absent any executive
agreement or other positive law specifically precluding or
extinguishing claims, "[i]t remains uncertain ...whether even
litigation on Holocaust-era insurance claims must be abated in
deference to the German Foundation Agreement or the parallel
agreements with Austria and France. '210 The dissent saw no
reason to invalidate HVIRA in light of the fact that the German
Foundation Agreement and the subsequent executive agreement
with Austria made no mention of disclosure statutes like HVIRA,
nor did they take the opportunity to expressly preempt them, even
though HVIRA was already in force when the executive
agreements were entered into. 211 Section 354.3 is not facially
unconstitutional and is thus appropriately evaluated without
212
regard to Zschernig.
D. Section 354.3 is Consistent with Minimal Existing
FederalPolicy Related to Holocaust-EraArt Claims
Altering the statute of limitations on Holocaust-era art
claims against present possessors who are unrelated to the
original wrongdoers is an action that, on its face, has no effect on
foreign relations, and that, as applied, would implicate foreign
relations only in rare cases. For example, foreign relations might
206. Id. at 419 n.l1.
207. Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. of Am. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 753 (9th Cir.
2001).
208. Id. at 751.
209. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 440 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
210. Id. See supranote 75.
211. Garamendi,539 U.S. at 441 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
212. See supra Part VI.B.
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be affected when a claim is brought against a foreign sovereign or
its agents, 213 or, as in Von Saher, when the particular claim turns
on an evaluation of the act of a foreign sovereign. 214 Those cases
may, when necessary, be dismissed on other grounds. 215 Section
354.3 does not threaten the federal government's ability to speak
with one voice in foreign relations, and is arguably consistent with
what little federal policy exists regarding resolution of Holocaustera art claims.
While the federal government undoubtedly has the power to
2 16
engage in foreign relations and to preempt states from doing SO,
2 7
many legitimate state activities touch on foreign relations. 1
States regulate the conduct of visiting foreign nationals; states
and large cities routinely send representatives to foreign countries
to promote trade and tourism; numerous cities have established
sister-city relationships with foreign cities; and state and local
governments wield spending power in ways that both reflect and
shape the behavior of foreign nations.2 18 Commentators argue that
not all such state behavior is, or should be, preempted, 21 9 and that
in fact the federal government sometimes actively encourages
220
states to engage in such relations.
In the realm of Holocaust-era art claims, the closest thing to
an articulation of federal policy is the non-binding Washington
Conference Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art from 1998,221 as

213. E.g., Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); Cassirer v. Spain, 461 F.
Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir.
2009), reh'ggranted, 590 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
214. See infra Part VI.E.
215. See supraPart II.
216. See supra Part II.C.
217. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One-Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign
Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 994-98 (2001); Michael H. Shuman, DatelineMain
Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, FOREIGN POLY, Spring 1992, at 158-59.
218. Cleveland, supra note 217, at 994-98; Shuman, supra note 217, at 158-59.
219. E.g., Richard H. Bilder, The Role of Cities and States in Foreign Relations,
83 AM. J. INT'L L. 821, 830 (1989) (endorsing cooperative attitudes toward state and
local involvement in foreign affairs); Shuman, supra note 217, at 177 ("To prohibit
states and cities from acting in all areas touching on things foreign inevitably
means . . . stripping localities of their traditional rights to zone, police, invest, and
contract."). Contra Howard N. Fenton III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign
Affairs: State and Local ForeignPolicy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
563, 563 (1993) ("[Tlhese state and local efforts threaten to undermine the
authority and effectiveness of United States' foreign policy.").
220. See Cleveland, supra note 217, at 1001 ("Despite the potential of state and
local activities to provoke international conflict, Congress and the President have
frequently tolerated, deferred to and in some cases abetted, such policies.").
221. Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-ConfiscatedArt, supra note 8, at
971.
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reaffirmed in the Terezin Declaration of June 2009.222 Broadly
worded, the Washington Principles encourage parties to reach a
"just and fair solution," and do not specifically preclude the judicial
resolution of claims. 223 Although Principle XI urges that nations
should "develop ...alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for
resolving ownership issues," 224 the United States has not created
any sort of alternate forum for the resolution of looted art
226
claims.
As applied to museums-the target of the California Code of
Civil Procedure section 354.3-a form of national policy is
expressed in the guidelines promulgated by the American
Association of Museums (AAM) and the Association of Art
Museum Directors (AAMD), the private organizations responsible
for the professional standards of U.S. art museums. 226 Both the
AAM and the AAMD consulted with the Presidential Commission
on Holocaust Assets in preparation of its final report on Holocaustera assets, and both were influenced by the Washington Principles
in formulating their own guidelines. 227 Both the AAM and the
AAMD guidelines express a preference for alternative dispute
resolution methods such as mediation. 228 Neither forecloses the
possibility of litigation, nor relieves museums of their fiduciary
obligation to investigate the validity of claims before resolving
them.229 Principle XI and the recommendations of some
commentators notwithstanding, 230 the creation of a national or
international non-judicial forum for the resolution of Holocaustera art claims is neither practical nor necessary. Museums take
seriously the professional standards that govern their conduct and
their ethical obligations to deal fairly with claimants; despite the
precatory nature of the AAM and AAMD guidelines, many
222. See HOLOCAUST ERA ASSETS CONFERENCE, supranote 179, at 4-5.
223. Washington Conference Principleson Nazi-ConfiscatedArt, supra note 8, at
971.
224. Id.
225. See Benjamin E. Pollock, Out of the Night and Fog: PermittingLitigation to
Prompt an InternationalResolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
193, 230 (2006).
226. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
227. AM. AsS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11; ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., supra
note 82, at 2.
228. AM. AsS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11; ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS, supra
note 96, at II.E.3.
229. AM. AsS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11; ASS'N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS, supra

note 96, at II.
230. See Kelly Ann Falconer, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a
Legally Binding InternationalAgreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art,
21 U. PA. J. INYL ECON. L. 383, 385 (2000); Pollock, supra note 225, at 224.
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museums have adopted and taken action pursuant to them. 231
Most of the meritorious claims against U.S. museums thus far
have been resolved privately between the museum and the
claimant. 232 Meritorious claims against private parties have also
been successfully settled privately, or litigated in the claimant's
favor. 233 Those that go to trial, such as Von Saher, are the cases
234
where private discussions or mediation have broken down.
In fact, the statute of limitations has rarely been used to bar
a Holocaust-era art claim against a museum. 235 The AAM
guidelines are explicit that museums "may elect to waive certain
available defenses" such as, presumably, the statute of
limitations. 236 Further, the equitable "discovery rule," by which a
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant
237
could reasonably discover the whereabouts of stolen property,
protects the interests of claimants who have yet to locate their
property, while incentivizing museums to make their collections
widely known and available for research. 238 Regardless of whether
a particular jurisdiction applies the discovery rule to actions to
231. E.g., J. Paul Getty Museum, Research on Museum Collection Provenance,
1933-45, http://www.getty.edu/museum/researchlprovenance/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2010) (documenting compliance with the AAMD guidelines); Minneapolis Institute
of Arts, Provenance Research Project, http://www.artsmia.org/
index.php?sectionid=107 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (documenting compliance with
the AAMD and AAM guidelines); Museum of Modern Art, Provenance Research
Project, http://www.moma.org/explore/collection/provenance/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2010) (documenting compliance with the AAM guidelines).
232. See Clark, supra note 83, at 371-400; Kennedy, supra note 171
("Agreements between parties without resort to judicial channels have been
frequent.").
233. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text; see also Vineberg v.
Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2008); see generally Clark, supra note 83, 371400 (listing eleven claims against private parties in the United States, seven of
which were settled or resolved in the claimant's favor).
234. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 8; Complaint for Declaratory
Relief at 16-17, Museum of Modern Art v. Schoeps, 549 F. Supp. 2d 543 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (No. 07-CV-11074); Complaint for an Order Quieting Title to Property
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1655, Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 7-8,
Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (No. 3:06 CV
7031).
235. See Clark, supra note 83, at 371-400. Of the twenty-eight "resolved" cases
listed that involved U.S. museums, the statute of limitations barred recovery only
twice. Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802; Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No.
06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2007). But see infra note 239.
236. AM. AS'N OF MUSEUMS, supra note 11.
237. See, e.g., O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 869 (N.J. 1980) ("[I]n an
appropriate case, a cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discovers,
or by exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have discovered, facts
which form the basis of a cause of action.").
238. Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen
CulturalProperty, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1177, 1192-93 (2005).
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recover stolen works of art, nothing suggests that a responsible
museum would raise a statute of limitations defense against a
239
truly meritorious claim brought in good faith.
E.

The Unique Facts of Von Saher Implicate the Prudential
Political Question and Act of State Doctrines

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
determination, Von Saher should not have been dismissed on the
grounds that the statute was preempted by the federal foreign
affairs power, but rather on the grounds that, regardless of the
statute of limitations, the case presents a nonjusticiable political
question, or, in the alternative, implicates the act of state doctrine.
The facts of this particular case indicate that Marei Von
Saher's grievance must be addressed not by a U.S. court or the
240
Norton Simon Museum, but rather by the Dutch government.
The United States' post-war policy of external restitution vested
sole responsibility for determining the fate of Adam and Eve in the
Dutch government. 241 "Once assets had been delivered to...
claimant nations, no further U.S. involvement was deemed
necessary or desirable." 242 Unlike an act of the Nazi government,
which under established policy and precedent would not be
entitled to any deference under the act of state doctrine, the
decision of the Dutch government to settle the Stroganoff-

239. See Kennedy, supra note 171 (suggesting that the "moral authority" of the
non-binding Washington Principles, the "opprobrium of one's peers," and the threat
of losing "one's good name in the art world" are sufficient to ensure museums will
act in the spirit of the Washington Principles); see also Clark, supra note 83, at
371-400. Twenty-four of the twenty-eight resolved museum cases listed involve the
return of the work to the claimant, the museum's purchase of the work from the
claimant, or a settlement, despite the fact that in many cases, the museum could
most likely have raised a technical statute of limitations defense. Clark, supra note
83, at 371-400. The Toledo and Detroit cases, which involved the same family, were
complicated by issues aside from the statute of limitations issue. Toledo Museum of
Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL 1016996, at *2. In those
cases, the fact that the original owner had successfully prosecuted numerous postwar compensation claims, yet had never claimed the particular paintings at issue,
cast doubt upon the heirs' assertions that the wartime sale had been coerced.
Toledo Museum of Art, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 807; Detroit Inst. of Arts, 2007 WL
1016996, at *2.
240. Cf. Alperin v. Vatican Bank (Alperin I1), 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th Cir. 2005)
('In this case, the Holocaust Survivors must look to the political branches for
resolution of [their claims] which, at base, are political questions.").
241. See supraPart I.B.
242. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE U.S., supra
note 14, at SR-140.
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act
Scherbatoff claim in 1966 is precisely the sort of sovereign
243
upon which U.S. courts wisely choose not to pass judgment.
Further, the Dutch government's efforts in the last decade to
reopen the claims process were accompanied by the recognition
that it was responsible for accounting, in some form, for artworks
disposed of by auction in the early 1950s, 2 44 which included some
of the Goudstikker collection. 245 Based on a theory of unjust
enrichment, the government estimated the proceeds from such
sales and proposed to donate a portion to a Jewish cultural
charity. 246 In principle, then, the Dutch government should be
accountable for all its decisions to dispose of restituted works,
particularly in a case like the Stroganoff-Scherbatoff claim, where
money changed hands and the Dutch government was enriched by
247
the transaction.
Conclusion
Courts should allow the relatively few Holocaust-era art
claims that are actually litigated to proceed, and decide each on its
merits. The doctrine of dormant foreign affairs preemption should
not be used to invalidate state legislation that facilitates existing
claims for the recovery of Holocaust-era assets, unless that
legislation clearly stands in conflict with positive law, policy, or
other action on the part of the federal government. In the absence
of such federal action, states should be free to legislate in their
areas of traditional competence, notwithstanding any incidental
effect on foreign affairs. 248 Although the federal government has
manifested its general interest in seeing justice done for Holocaust
survivors, it has chosen not to provide a federal mechanism for
recovery of Holocaust-era artworks, nor to legislate on the subject,
but rather to permit the resolution of claims on a case-by-case, and
state-by-state, basis. Statutes like section 354.3 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure serve to further the broadly stated federal
interest by assisting the victims of the Holocaust in resolving
meritorious claims for lost property where it is within a state's
jurisdiction to do so and where no other prudential considerations
require abstention or dismissal. U.S. museums, guided by the

243. See supra Part II.A.
244. ORIGINS UNKNOWN ADVISORY COMM., supra note 142.
245. Kaye, supra note 138, at 58-59.
246. ORIGINS UNKNOWN ADVISORY COMM., supra note 142.
247. Norton Simon Complaint, supra note 129, at 18.
248. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 458-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring
in the result).

2010]

Holocaust-EraArt Claims

405

expressed, but nonspecific, federal interest in the resolution of
Holocaust-era claims, have demonstrated their willingness to
return works of art to their rightful owners in response to
meritorious claims. So long as courts avoid the unnecessary
exercise of dormant foreign affairs preemption, the existing ethical
and legal framework is adequate to ensure a "just and fair
solution" to Holocaust-related claims.

